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ABSTRACT
In April 2018, Hong Kong issued new listing rules to introduce the dual-class
share structure, also known as weighted voting rights (WVR), under which a
special class of shareholders’ voting rights are conferred disproportionately
with respect to their equity interest. The WVR was used in Hong Kong in the
1980s but was banned in 1989. The debate on the WVR was rekindled by
the Alibaba event in 2013. The WVR structure has benefits and costs. Thus,
Hong Kong lays down relevant supporting mechanisms, including entry
requirements, disclosure requirements and safeguard requirements. The WVR
regime in Hong Kong appears to be more stringent than jurisdictions that
have either long allowed WVR listings, notably the United States and Canada,
or recently chose to do so such as Singapore. This paper argues that the
(re)introduction of the WVR regime is generally a positive development for
Hong Kong, but there are still some lingering concerns.
ARTICLE HISTORY Received 11 December 2018; Accepted 24 June 2019
KEYWORDS Dual-class share structure; weighted voting rights; Hong Kong securities markets; corporate
governance; shareholder protection
1. Introduction
On 24 April 2018, the Hong Kong Securities and Exchanges Limited (‘HKEX’)
formally introduced new listing rules (‘2018 New Listing Rules’) under which
listing applicants can adopt the dual-class share structure, also known as
weighted voting rights (‘WVR’).1 According to the conventional ‘one-share,
one-vote’ (‘OSOV’) rule, each share attaches a proportionate amount of
voting rights (i.e. one share conferring one voting right). In contrast, under
the WVR structure, shareholders’ voting rights are conferred disproportionately
© 2019 Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group
CONTACT Robin Hui Huang huanghui93@tsinghua.org.cn
1Rules Governing the Listing of Securities on The Stock Exchange of Hong Kong Limited (‘HKEX Listing
Rule’). This refers to the listing rule for companies listed on the Main Board of the Stock Exchange of
Hong Kong (‘SEHK’), which is the sole stock exchange in Hong Kong and is wholly owned by the
parent company, HKEX. The 2018 New Listing Rules came into effect on 30 April 2018.
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with respect to their equity interest, which are differentiated by different classes
of shares.
Essentially, the WVR structure creates a divergence between cash flow and
voting rights. The rationale behind the WVR structure is to enable founders or
controlling shareholders of a company to raise equity financing without sur-
rendering control.2 Traditionally, this was used mostly by family-run media
companies, such as The Wall Street Journal and The New York Times, as a
strategy to avoid hostile takeovers under the name of protecting journalistic
integrity.3 In 2004, Google became one of the first companies to bring it to the
mainstream, particularly high-tech companies.
The introduction of the WVR regime represents a radical departure from
the OSOV rule that has long served as the bedrock principle of corporate gov-
ernance in Hong Kong. This is largely due to the rising propensity from large
Silicon Valley counterparts in China, such as Alibaba, in demanding WVR struc-
tures, and the fierce competition among leading stock exchanges. While the
introduction of the WVR regime may effectively attract substantial capital
inflows into Hong Kong, the risks of jeopardising investor protection
remains a primary concern. Indeed, the 2018 New Listing Rules did not
come by easily, reaching its final adoption after five long years of consultation
and deliberation, and even today the debate continues. Hence, this paper
aims to critically examine the newly implemented WVR regime from historical
and comparative perspectives, shedding light on whether it is appropriate
and well-designed for the local conditions in Hong Kong.
This paper is organised as follows. It begins with an overview of the WVR
structure in Part 2, which introduces the concept of the WVR as well as its his-
torical development in Hong Kong. Part 3 then examines relevant theoretical
issues on the WVR, including a cost–benefit analysis and a taxonomy of legal
strategies for reducing agency costs. Based on those discussions, Part 4 com-
pares the supporting mechanisms in Hong Kong with jurisdictions that have
either long implemented a WVR regime (USA and Canada) or has recently
introduced a WVR regime (Singapore). Part 5 then applies the observations
made in the previous sections to evaluate the newly-introduced WVR
regime in Hong Kong. The final part concludes.
2. WVR in Hong Kong: a historical perspective
2.1. Overview of the legal framework
It should be noted at the outset that Hong Kong-incorporated companies are
in fact allowed to issue different classes of shares with differing rights
2S Nuesch, ‘Dual-Class Shares, External Financing Needs, and Firm Performance’, (2016) 20 Journal of Man-
agement & Governance 525–51, at 526.
3K Eechambadi, ‘The Dual Class Voting Structure, Associated Agency Issues, and a Path Forward’, (2017) 13
New York University Journal of Law and Business 503–34, at 514.
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attached. Under section 588(4) of the Companies Ordinance4 and section
50(4) of the Companies (Model Articles) Notice5, the number of votes
vested in a company’s share is subject to its articles of association, which
may be freely drafted to stipulate different classes of shares attaching
different number of votes. This is the default position under the general
framework of company law.
However, for listed companies, there is an additional layer of regulation
imposed by the HKEX listing rules. As empowered under section 23 of the
Securities and Futures Ordinance (‘SFO’)6, the HKEX listing rules prescribes
the requirements that must be adhered to before securities of any
company can be listed, as well as on-going obligations throughout the
period of listing.7 Under the HKEX Listing Rules, share structures are much
more restricted when compared to the broader rules of company law under
the Companies Ordinance.8
2.2. Historical developments
2.2.1. The restrictions on WVR in the 1980s
Prior to 1987, the HKEX Listing Rules did not contain a default restriction of the
WVR structure. However, as a result of negative market reaction, regulators
responded by imposing a ban on them. In late March and early April of
1987, following the announcements of issuing superior shares (called ‘B
shares’) via bonus issues by three local giants, namely Jardine Matheson Hold-
ings Limited, Cheung Kong (Holdings) Ltd and Hutchison Whampoa Ltd, the
Hang Seng Index (‘HSI’) dropped by 3.7 per cent9 due to market fears of a
bandwagon-effect for the WVR share proposals.10 During that time, class B
shares were not common on the exchange and only five listed companies11
had this structure. As a swift response to stabilise the market, the regulators
being the HKEX and the Government’s Office of Commissioner for Securities12
issued a joint statement leading to the restriction of B share issues, weeks after
the B share proposal announcements.13 The resulting effect of this joint
4Cap. 622.
5Cap. 622H.
6Cap. 571.
7HKEX Listing Rule 2.01, at part 2-1.
8Cap. 622.
9Hong Kong Exchanges and Clearings Ltd, ‘Concept Paper: Weighted Voting Rights’ (2014), at 26.
10J Nylander, ‘Should Hong Kong Permit Weighted Voting Rights?’, The Hong Kong Institute of Chartered
Secretaries (2015), published 5 January 2015, at http://csj.hkics.org.hk/site/2015/01/05/should-hong-
kong-permit-weighted-voting-rights-2/
11They include Swire Pacific Ltd; Lane Crawford International Ltd; Wheelock Properties Ltd; Realty Devel-
opment Corp Ltd and Grand Hotel Holdings Ltd. See Hong Kong Exchanges and Clearings Ltd (n 9) at
25–26.
12This was Hong Kong’s previous securities regulator prior to the formation of the current Securities and
Futures Commission in 1989.
13Hong Kong Exchanges and Clearings Ltd (n 9) at 26.
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statement along with recommendations of the 1987 Standing Committee on
Company Law Reform14, eventually led to the default WVR restriction under
Rule 8.11 of the Main Board listing rules in 1989.15
By virtue of Rule 8.11, all companies listed on the SEHK must have shares
where the prescribed ‘voting power’ must bear a ‘reasonable relationship’ to
the equity interest of fully paid shares. Strictly speaking, this means no share-
holder would be entitled to greater voting rights than any other shareholders
given the equity stake invested is equal. Thus, Rule 8.11 prohibits any form of
WVR structures16 and additionally upholds the ‘fair and equal treatment of
shareholders’17 principle by aligning the voting power and equity interest
of shares.18 Rule 8.11, however, does incorporate two exceptions where
WVR shares are allowed. First, as a product of the recommendations of the
1987 Standing Committee on Company Law Reform, WVR structures are
allowable under ‘exceptional circumstances’.19 However, as of now, there
have yet to be any examples falling under such exception. Second, companies
already trading with B shares prior to the introduction of Rule 8.11 are allowed
to maintain such structure. However, of the five previously mentioned compa-
nies, only Swire Pacific Ltd. remain listed on the SEHK at present.20 As men-
tioned below, the new WVR regime in Hong Kong is implemented as an
additional third exception to Rule 8.11.
2.2.2. Re-emergence of the WVR debate after the 2013 Alibaba IPO
application
Since the adoption of Rule 8.11 in 1989, the matter of WVR (or class B shares)
has not resurfaced in Hong Kong until recent rejection of the Alibaba
initial public offering (‘IPO’) by Hong Kong regulators in 2013. Without
doubt, this is the triggering catalyst leading to the re-emergence of WVR
discussions.
In the midst of September 2013, Alibaba ended its plan to list in Hong Kong
after its proposed ‘partnership structure’ was rejected under Rule 8.11. What
unexpected following this decline was an unprecedented amount of fund
14The then Financial Secretary, Sir Piers Jacobs commissioned the Standing Committee to give opinions on
the issue of B shares. See ibid 27 and Appendix I for the actual report by the Standing Committee.
15ibid at 28.
16To put it another way, it also implements the OSOV structure.
17HKEX Listing Rule 2.03(4), at part 2-1.
18Hong Kong Exchanges and Clearings Ltd (n 9) at 18.
19The Standing Committee concluded that there was a legitimate need for the availability of ‘B shares’
under ‘exceptional circumstances’ such as national security or public interest, but subject to a case-
by-case approval. See ibid at 28.
20Upon searching on the HKEX web page, only Swire Pacific (stock code: 0019 for Class A and 0087 for
Class B) can be found from the five previously dual-class listed stocks. See Hong Kong Exchanges and
Clearings Ltd, Market Data – Equities, at https://www..com.hk/Market-Data/Securities-Prices/Equities?
sc_lang=en.
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(USD 25 billion) raised by the Alibaba IPO on the New York Stock Exchange
(‘NYSE’), only a year later.21
With the benefit of hindsight, many believed that the decline caused a
tragic loss for the Hong Kong market and it was an excessive protectionist
decision by the regulators.22 Although Hong Kong still managed to rank as
the second largest IPO market in terms of the amount of IPO funds raised
in 2014, it should be noted that the aggregate amount of USD 29 billion
raised from 122 IPOs was not substantially higher than the amount from
the Alibaba IPO alone (USD 25 billion). Nevertheless, those who greatly
value strong corporate governance praised HKEX’s robust stance to uphold
the traditional OSOV system.23
2.2.3. Developments of the WVR debate
Since the lost-out of Alibaba, the HKEX has put the WVR debate into serious
consideration by publishing several consultation papers involving analyses
and discussions of a possible WVR regime in Hong Kong – perhaps as an
effort to address the disapproving voices of the Alibaba case. After almost
one year from rejection, the HKEX published a concept paper24 to seek
market view of WVR structures proposals. After receiving ample market feed-
back, the HKEX proposed a possible WVR framework containing a list of safe-
guards and ring-fencing measures in the WVR Consultation Conclusions
Paper.25 However, only six days following the publication, the Securities and
Futures Commission (‘SFC’) issued a formal statement announcing that the
Board of the SFC had unanimously rejected the HKEX draft proposal.
Two years later, the HKEX revived the WVR matter through its New Board
Concept Paper26 in 2017. By proposing a new and separate board to be
created in addition to the two existing boards (being the Main and GEM
Boards), the HKEX tried to ringfence the WVR structures and dispel concerns
over its impact on the whole market. This new round of the WVR campaign
received overwhelming support (91% of respondents) from the market by
attracting more diversified issuers especially those in the area of ‘New
Economy’.27 Interestingly, the SFC also reversed its stance towards the WVR
regime and supported the HKEX. Further, considering that a sea change
21L Chen, R Mac R and B Solomon, ‘Alibaba Claims Title For Largest Global IPO Ever With Extra Share Sales’
(2014), Forbes, published 22 September 2014, at https://www.forbes.com/sites/ryanmac/2014/09/22/
alibaba-claims-title-for-largest-global-ipo-ever-with-extra-share-sales/#567287ba8dcc.
22RS Chan and JKS Ho, ‘Should Listed Companies Be Allowed to Adopt Dual-Class Share Structure in Hong
Kong?’ (2014) 43 Common Law World Review 155–82, at 174.
23PJ Davies and A Massoudi, ‘Alibaba Abandons $60bn Hong Kong Listing’, Financial Times (26 September
2013), at https://www.ft.com/content/525f4bc2-25ae-11e3-aee8-00144feab7de.
24Hong Kong Exchanges and Clearings Ltd (n 9).
25Hong Kong Exchanges and Clearings Ltd, ‘Consultation Conclusions: To Concept Paper on Weighted
Voting Rights’ (2015), at 44–45.
26Hong Kong Exchanges and Clearings Ltd, ‘Concept Paper: New Board’ (2017).
27These are companies from industries such as ‘Biotechnology, Health Care Technology, Internet & Direct
Marketing Retail, Internet Software & Services, IT Services, Software, Technology Hardware, Storage &
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had taken place in the public’s attitudes towards the WVR structure,28 the
HKEX decided to abandon the plan of limiting the WVR structure in the
new board and try to allow it in the whole market. Hence, the HKEX issued
another consultation paper on the reform of the Main Board Listing Rules in
late February 2018.29 Finally, on 24 April 2018, with positive feedback from
the market and the SFC, the HKEX published the final version of the new
listing rules, which took effect on 30 April 2018.
The WVR regime was implemented by adding a new chapter (Chapter 8A)
to the 2018 Listing Rules. Chapter 8A stipulates an extensive list of conditions
and safeguards for a company to be qualified to adopt the WVR structure.30
The HKEX emphasised that the OSOV shall remain as the ideal structure,
and the WVR regime shall serve as an exception to the OSOV structure.31
This is achieved by inserting an additional criterion under the existing list of
‘exceptions’ of Rule 8.11, whereby a company must satisfy the requirements
stipulated under Chapter 8A.32
3. Debating the WVR: an analytical framework
3.1. A cost-benefit analysis of the WVR
There has been a long-standing debate on the desirability of the WVR struc-
tures from the viewpoint of a cost–benefit analysis. In brief, supporters of the
WVR structures argue that the regime could enable the companies to pursue
long-term innovations and strategies maximising the market returns and the
diversity of issuers.33 On the other hand, opponents argue that the WVR struc-
ture increases the risks of expropriation and entrenchment by the WVR share-
holders and further may lead to indirect concerns to the greater market.34
Peripherals’. See Hong Kong Exchanges and Clearings Ltd, ‘Consultation Conclusions: New Board
Concept Paper’ (2017), at 5.
28According to our interviews with SFC, HKEX and market participants, several factors may help explain
why the market and, particularly the SFC, took a 180 degree turn in the WVR debate. First, there has
been a growing recognition of the great need and competitive pressure that Hong Kong faces in attract-
ing listings of new economy companies. With the departing of the Alibaba and the draining away of the
long-time source of listing business, namely the state-owned enterprises from Mainland, Hong Kong
came to realize that it is time to embrace the era of the so-called ‘new economy’. Second, as will be
discussed in detail, the WVR regime in Hong Kong has carefully designed a congeries of mechanisms
to address the problems that the WVR structure may cause. Finally, the change of government in
July 2017 in Hong Kong provided political incentives and opportunities to support the WVR structure.
29Hong Kong Exchanges and Clearings Ltd, ‘Consultation Paper: A Listing Regime for Companies from
Emerging and Innovative Sectors’ (2018).
30Hong Kong Exchanges and Clearings Ltd, ‘Consultation Conclusions: A Listing Regime for Companies
from Emerging and Innovative Sectors’ (2018), at 36.
31ibid.
32HKEX Listing Rules Listing Rule 8.11(3), at part 8-11.
33See e.g. TJ Chemmanur and Y Jiao, ‘Dual Class IPOs: A Theoretical Analysis’ (2012) 36 Journal of Banking
and Finance 305–19, at 306; Z Goshen and A Hamdani, ‘Corporate Control and Idiosyncratic Vision’
(2016) 125 Yale Law Journal 560–795, at 576.
34See e.g. JW Howell, ‘The Survival of the US Dual class Share Structure’ (2017) 44 Journal of Corporate
Finance 440–50; R Masulis, C Wang and F Xie, ‘Agency Problems at Dual-Class Companies’ (2009) 64
The Journal of Finance 1697–727, at 1698.
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3.1.1. Costs of WVR
In general, the WVR structure encourages the controlling shareholder to
engage in opportunistic behaviour at the cost of non-controlling share-
holders, either directly by way of voting rights at the shareholder meeting
or indirectly through the management they choose. By separating voting
rights from cash flow rights, the WVR structure has the potential to create
very large agency costs, including the risks of expropriation and entrench-
ment.35 Other things being equal, the agency costs of the WVR structure
have been said to be an order of magnitude larger than those under the tra-
ditional OSOV structure.36
The WVR structure exacerbates the risks of expropriation because the dis-
proportionate economic interest proliferates the divergence of interests
between the controlling shareholders and the non-controlling shareholders.
Since holders of WVR shares have a much smaller economic interest relative
to their voting rights, they consequently bear smaller financial risks for
decisions that favour their personal interests instead of maximising
company profits and shareholder value.37 Another facilitator for expropriation
risks is the weakened monitoring corporate governance function under a WVR
structure.38 Due to the separation of control and ownership in a public
company, the traditional corporate governance function is for shareholders
to elect members of the board of directors, who then performs the monitoring
function of the company, including contracting for suitable officers to run the
day-to-day operations of the company. Since the shareholders select the
board, there exist a ‘check and balance’ mechanism to align the interests of
the shareholders (the principal) and the management (the agents).
However, under the WVR structure, the board oversight function is under-
mined as the controlling company management elects the board instead of
the majority shareholders, due to their superior voting power. This may
lead to heightened propensity of self-dealing or ‘tunnelling’ transactions,
and accordingly, may also place a greater burden on connected-party trans-
action monitoring.
35Due to the separation of voting rights from cash flow rights under a WVR structure, the WVR share-
holders are controlling shareholders in terms of voting rights, but may be minority shareholders in
terms of cash flow rights. Hence, to avoid confusion, this paper refers to the WVR shareholder as con-
trolling shareholder rather than majority shareholder.
36Lucian Bebchuk, Reinier Kraakman and George Triantis, ‘Stock Pyramids, Cross-Ownership, and Dual
Class Equity: The Creation and Agency Costs of Separating Control From Cash-Flow Rights’ in Randall
K Morck (ed), Concentrated Corporate Ownership (University of Chicago Press 2000) 445–60.
37LA Bebchuk and K Kastiel, ‘The Untenable Case for Perpetual Dual-Class Stock’ (2017) 103 Virginia Law
Review 585–630, at 602.
38T Wen, ‘You Can’t Sell Your Firm And Own It Too: Disallowing Dual-Class Stock Companies from Listing
on the Securities Exchanges’ (2014) 162 University of Pennsylvania Law Review 1495–516, at 1498; M
Ganor, ‘Why Do Dual-Class Firms Have Staggered Boards’ (2016) 10 Ohio State Business Law Journal
147–92, at 156.
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Further, the WVR structure creates entrenchment risks whereby the con-
trolling shareholder and the management they choose ‘entrench’ themselves
with perpetual control of the company. Under a OSOV structure, evidence of
company underperformance signals the shareholders that the board of direc-
tors are suboptimal in managing the company. If underperformance persists,
shareholders may remove members of the board and elect a superior man-
agement body to steer the company back to an equilibrium level.39
However, under the WVR structure, shareholders lack the voting power to
remove the board of directors, irrespective of how poorly they manage the
company. Moreover, the WVR structure insulates the management from the
threat of hostile takeovers which is widely seen as a powerful mechanism
to pressurise the management to work diligently for the best interest of the
company. A further form of the entrenchment risk is the so-called ‘next gen-
eration’ problem. Essentially, this concerns the problem where the controlling
shareholder has full autonomy to elect his or her successors and thus, creating
an everlasting dictatorship scenario.
3.1.2. Benefits of WVR
One of the strongest rationales in support of the WVR structure is that it
can better enable the company to pursue long-term objectives and visions
when compared to OSOV structures. This is because the WVR structure can
help overcome the following two main problems associated with the OSOV
structure, including information asymmetry between ordinary shareholders
and the management, and different investment time horizons among
shareholders.
To start with, there may be a discrepancy among shareholders as to the
means of achieving the goal of maximising investment returns, due to the
issue of information asymmetry. While ordinary shareholders may be
influenced by commonplace information and statistics, the controlling share-
holders and the management they appoint may possess visions and strategies
unknown to the public that may produce above-market returns, despite of
initial losses. Such visionary knowledge may need to be concealed from the
public as means of preserving competitive advantages or that they are
simply too novel for the ordinary shareholders to understand.40 This may
be particularly true in the high-technology industry, due to its complexity
and dynamic nature. Further, there exists a disparity in the investment time
horizons among shareholders. Many shareholders may prefer short-term
returns, while some shareholders may be more interested in the long-term
growth of the company. A company with the OSOV structures may be more
39Sanford J. Grossman and Oliver D. Hart, ‘One Share-One Vote and the Market For Corporate Control’
(1988) 20 Journal of Financial Economics 175.
40V Govindarajan and A Srivastava, ‘Reexamining Dual-Class Stock’ (2017), Tuck School of Business Working
Paper No. 3023323, at 4–5.
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likely to be compelled to adopt short-termism. In contrast, the WVR structure
can help shield the company from these pressures and enable them to pursue
long-term opportunities.
More broadly, the availability of the WVR structure increases the attractive-
ness of a capital market to issuers who value such a share structure and
provide a wider range of investment options for investors. This is important
as the investors are not a homogenous group in terms of their investment
style and risk preference. Hence, the WVR structure can improve the competi-
tiveness of the market by increasing the diversity of securities offering to
investors and its attractiveness to issuers. The increased competitiveness of
a capital market will then indirectly contribute to the general economy
through various supporting business activities. These spill-over contributions
can be substantial and takes multiple forms such as the commissions made by
the IPO sponsors, the legal fees involved with the IPO process and the stock
exchange fees both before and after the IPO – just to name a few. For
example, regarding the Alibaba IPO on the NYSE, sponsorship fees totalling
USD 300 million were paid to its bankers and brokerages41, while legal fees
amounted to USD 15.8 million.42
3.2. A taxonomy of legal strategies for reducing agency costs
Agency costs are inherent in the corporate context and law can play an impor-
tant role in reducing them. It has been argued in a very influential book that
the legal strategies for controlling corporate agency costs can be grouped into
five areas, including agent constraints, affiliation terms, incentive alignment,
appointment rights and decision rights, and under each of the five areas,
there are two different types of legal strategies.43 In addition, disclosure is
crucial to the functioning of the above legal strategies by providing relevant
information.44 This provides a very useful framework for analysing the legal
strategies for reducing agency costs of the WVR structures as identified
above, and thus will be briefly summarised below.
To start with, law seeks to constrain agents by commanding them not to
engage in certain behaviour which would harm the interests of their prin-
ciples, either through rules or standards. The debate on the relative efficacy
of rules versus standards has been a longstanding one,45 but generally,
41Trefis, ‘Alibaba Hands Out Generous Fees to Investment Banks Involved In Its IPO, Forbes (1 October
2014), at https://www.forbes.com/sites/greatspeculations/2014/10/01/alibaba-hands-out-generous-
fees-to-investment-banks-involved-in-its-ipo/#77c4a395e936.
42C Sullivan, ‘Alibaba IPO Legal Fees Dwarf Facebook’s’, Reuters (6 September 2014), at https://www.
reuters.com/article/us-alibaba-ipo-legal/alibaba-ipo-legal-fees-dwarf-facebooks-
idUSKBN0H100D20140906.
43Reinier Kraakman, John Armour and Paul Davies, The Anatomy of Corporate Law: A Comparative and
Functional Approach (3rd edn, OUP 2017), 31–38.
44ibid 38–39.
45See e.g. Louis Kaplow, ‘Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis’ (1992) 42 Duke Law Journal 557.
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each has its own strengths and weaknesses. For instance, rules are more
certain and can be more easily enforced, but may suffer from rigidity and
invite loopholes; standards are more flexible but may lead to uncertainty
and inconsistency in compliance and enforcement. Hence, both rules and
standards are needed to form a balanced approach to reducing agency costs.
Second, affiliation terms mean the terms on which principals affiliate with
agents, including terms of entry and terms of exit. Under the terms of entry,
the law can protect principals by enabling them to make a free and informed
decision on whether to contract with agents. Alternatively, the terms of exist
can give principals a decent chance to escape opportunistic agents.
Third, incentive alignment strategies are divided into trusteeship and
reward, according to the nature of the incentives used to reduce the
agent’s opportunistic behaviour. There are two types of incentives in the
economic literature, including economic incentives such as monetary
payment and ethical or moral incentives such as conscience, pride and repu-
tation.46 Economic incentives are usually high-powered in that they are con-
crete and sharply focused; moral incentives are conceptually low-powered,
even though they may be more important for many people in practice. The
trusteeship strategy, which is named after its origin in the role of a ‘trustee’
proper, relies upon moral incentives on the part of the agent, while the
reward strategy, as the name suggests, uses monetary incentives to induce
the agents to serve the interests of their principals.
Fourth, appointment rights include selection rights and removals rights. In
the corporate context, appointment rights are usually used in relation to direc-
tors and managers, but they are also important to address agency problems of
controlling shareholders in relation to non-controlling shareholders.
Fifth, decision rights are divided into initiation and ratification rights, allow-
ing the principals to initiate or ratify management decisions respectively. As
the corporate form is based on the delegation of managerial powers to the
board of directors, shareholders usually do not have the power to initiate
managerial decisions, and are empowered to ratify the most fundamental cor-
porate decisions only.
It should be noted that we basically adopt the above analytical framework
but with one important modification. Under the taxonomy supplied above,
the two different types of legal strategies in each of the five areas are con-
sidered as ex ante and ex post strategies. But as the book itself concedes,
due to issues such as overlapping, it does not wish to ‘overemphasize the
clarity or analytic power of this categorization… ’, and just offers it as a heur-
istic device.47 We will then use the terms ex ante and ex post in a different way.
46Oliver Williamson, The Economic Institutions of Capitalism (1985), 137–41.
47Kraakman, Armour and Davies (n 43) 38.
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As will be discussed in more detail later, different jurisdictions have
designed different mechanisms to support their WVR regimes, which we
term ‘WVR-supporting mechanisms’. Broadly speaking, WVR-supporting
mechanisms can be divided into ex ante and ex post mechanisms. On the
one hand, ex ante supporting mechanisms seek to prevent or deter the oppor-
tunism of the agents, including the controlling shareholders and the manage-
ment they appoint. Hong Kong has put in place three groups of new
requirements for WVR companies, including entry requirements, disclosure
requirements and safeguard requirements. On the other hand, ex post sup-
porting mechanisms refer to the routes for aggrieved shareholders to seek
remedies after the occurrence of opportunistic behaviour by the agents. For
instance, as the agents’ misbehaviour may usually harm multiple principals
but each in relatively small value, an important issue here is the availability
of class action. In effect, ex post mechanisms are essentially law enforcement,
which can be broadly divided into public and private enforcements. As with
any legal regime, the efficacy of the WVR regime is a function of both substan-
tive rules and enforcement mechanisms.
4. WVR-supporting mechanisms: jurisdictional comparison
The foregoing discussion shows that the WVR structure has both benefits and
costs, and that WVR-supporting mechanisms, ex ante and ex post, work to
control agency costs. The real question is not simply whether the WVR struc-
ture should be allowed or not in any jurisdiction, but what supporting mech-
anisms should be introduced to generate a WVR structure with net benefits in
the context of a particular jurisdiction. In other words, the WVR structure may
have different versions with different effects due to different supporting
mechanisms adopted in different jurisdictions.48 Hence, we will discuss and
compare the WVR-supporting mechanisms in Hong Kong with Singapore,
48Since the supporting mechanisms vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, caution should be exercised in
generalising empirical findings about the effect of the WVR structure on firm value in any particular jur-
isdiction. Most empirical studies are conducted in the US, and even there, empirical results are mixed.
See e.g. S Nuesch, ‘Dual-Class Shares, External Financing Needs, and Firm Performance’ (2016) 20 Journal
of Management & Governance 525–51 (finding that WVR firms outperformed OSOV firms in terms of
total shareholder returns); S Baugess, M Slovin and M Sushka, ‘Large Shareholder Diversification, Corpor-
ate Risk Taking, and the Benefits of Changing to Differential Voting Rights’ (2012) 36 Journal of Banking
& Finance 1244–53 (indicating that the adoption of WVR shares promotes firm performance); but see R
Masulis, C Wang and F Xie, ‘Agency Problems at Dual-Class Companies’ (2009) 64 The Journal of Finance
1697–727, at 1698–700 (reporting evidence of the detrimental effects of the WVR); P Gompers, J Ishii
and A Metrick, ‘Extreme Governance: An Analysis of Dual-Class Firms in the United States’ (2010) 23
The Review of Financial Studies 1051–88 (finding that the WVR led to lower firm valuations). Latest
researches, however, show that the costs of the WVR structure tends to rise, while the benefits
decline, as companies with such structures mature, see Hyunseob Kim and Roni Michaely, Sticking
Around Too Long? Dynamics of the Benefits of Dual-Class Structures, working paper, https://papers.ssrn.
com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3145209; Martijn Cremers, Beni Lauterbach and Anete Pajuste, The
Life-Cycle of Dual Class Firms, working paper, https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=
3062895.
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the US and Canada.49 Singapore is Hong Kong’s arch-rival for the status of
leading financial centre in Asia, and both have recently chosen to adopt the
WVR structure. The US and Canada have had the WVR structure for many
years, but with different supporting mechanisms. This sets the stage for the
later discussion of how the supporting mechanisms embody the aforemen-
tioned various legal strategies for reducing controller opportunism.
4.1. Hong Kong
4.1.1. Ex ante mechanisms
Included in the HKEX 2018 New Listing Rules50 is a new WVR regime to allow
innovative companies to list in Hong Kong with a WVR share structure. This
new regime involves more stringent rules specifically required for WVR appli-
cants in addition to the existing Listing Rules as Chapter 8A.
4.1.1.1. Entry requirements. The 2018 New Listing Rules permits only new
issuers51 to adopt WVR structures setting up entry requirements in terms of
company characteristics and expected market capitalisation. To close the
loopholes that may enable circumventions of the ‘new’ issuer requirement
there is also an anti-avoidance provision in Rule 8A.05, the infringement of
which may invoke SFC’s enforcement powers.52
Regarding the quantitative requirement, the rules require an expected
market capitalisation of HKD 10 billion as the minimum requirement for a
company to be eligible for a WVR structure.53 Where an applicant company
has an expected market capitalisation of less than HKD 40 billion, there is
an additional requirement of having at least HKD 1 billion of revenue from
the most recent audited financial year.54 This market capitalisation require-
ment is intended to limit WVR companies only to ‘established and high
profile companies’.55
In terms of the qualitative characteristics, to be regarded as suitable for a
WVR listing the HKEX requires that issuers can demonstrate that they are
‘both eligible and suitable for listing with a WVR structure’.56 Five criteria are
set out in a separate guidance letter57 to ensure only innovative companies
49Other major jurisdictions adopting the WVR structure include Denmark, Finland, the Netherlands,
Sweden and Switzerland. HKEX, Concept Paper on Weighted Voting Rights (2014) para 111-1 to 111-17.
50Hong Kong Exchanges and Clearings Ltd (n 30).
51HKEX Listing Rule 8A.05, at part 8A-3.
52Hong Kong Exchanges and Clearings Ltd (n 30) at 31.
53HKEX Listing Rule 8A.06(2), at part 8A-3.
54ibid.
55Hong Kong Exchanges and Clearings Ltd (n 29) at 34.
56HKEX Listing Rule 8A.04, at part 8A-3.
57Hong Kong Exchanges and Clearings Ltd, HKEX Guidance Letter: Suitability for listing with a WVR Structure
(April 2018).
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of good quality and high growth are listed with WVR shares.58 These criteria
are as follows:
(1) the applicant issuer must be an ‘innovative’ company59
(2) the applicant issuer must demonstrate a track record of high business
growth that can be objectively measured by operational metrics
(3) each WVR shareholder must have been materially responsible for the
company growth by way of his or her skills and knowledge
(4) each WVR shareholder must be an individual with an active executive role
within the business and must be a director of the issuer
(5) the applicant issuer must have received meaning third party investment
from at least one sophisticated investor who shall retain at least an aggre-
gate of 50% of their total investment at the time of listing.
The HKEX will consider the totality of circumstances to determine the suit-
ability for WVR so that demonstration of any or all of the five criteria may not
in and of itself guarantee the suitability of the applicant.60 Acknowledging
that the above determination will inevitably involve certain degree of subjec-
tivity, the HKEX intends to provide further clarity to the market as they
develop further experience with innovative and emerging companies.61
4.1.1.2. Disclosure requirements. To increase the transparency and public
awareness of WVR companies, the HKEX requires additional disclosures for
WVR companies. A ‘WVR warning’ will be prominently disclosed on the
front page of all listing documents, periodic financial reports, circulars, notifi-
cations and announcements62 as well as documents of or evidencing the title
of listed equity securities of a WVR issuer.63 For all listing documents and per-
iodic financial reports, the ‘WVR warning’ would further include a description
of the WVR structure, the rationales for the company to adopt a WVR structure,
and the associated risks for shareholder.64 In the proposal stage of the WVR
rules, the HKEX initially required that all corporate documents for disclosure
would need to include the description, rationales and associated risks of
58Hong Kong Exchanges and Clearings Ltd (n 29) at 33.
59Companies would be expected to meet more than one of the following characteristics: (1) its success is
demonstrated to be attributable to the application, to the company’s core business, of new technologies;
innovations; and/or a new business model, which also serves to differentiate the company from existing
players; (2) R&D is a significant contributor of its expected value and constitutes a major activity and
expense; (3) its success is demonstrated to be attributable to its unique features or intellectual property;
and/or (4) it has an outsized market capitalisation / intangible asset value relative to its tangible asset
value. See ibid at 2–3.
60ibid at 1.
61Hong Kong Exchanges and Clearings Ltd (n 30) at 36.
62HKEX Listing Rule 8A.37, at part 8A-12.
63HKEX Listing Rule 8A.38, at part 8A-12.
64HKEX Listing Rule 8A.37, at part 8A-12.
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the WVR company.65 However, the HKEX concurred with the market feedback
that this would not be practical and lowered the requirement.66 This warning
informs the public that the company is controlled under a WVR structure and
informs public investors of the potential risks of investing in a company with a
WVR structure. Moreover, the holders of WVR shares must also be identified in
the listing documents and also interim and annual reports. To enhance the
visual differentiation between WVR companies from non-WVR companies, a
unique stock marker ‘W’ will be placed at the end of the stock name.67
Lastly, as suggested from market feedback, the HKEX have agreed to
include the requirement that WVR issuers must disclose in its listing docu-
ments and annual and interim reports all circumstances whereby the WVRs
attached to shares would cease.68
4.1.1.3. Safeguard requirements. To mitigate the above-mentioned WVR
risks of expropriation and entrenchment, the New Listing Rules enhance safe-
guard requirements for WVR companies. These include mechanisms that (1)
protect non-WVR shareholders’ voting rights, (2) limit the divergence of
rights between WVR shares and non-WVR shares, (3) restrict WVR shareholders
to be directors and (4) enhance monitoring by board committees.
First, the New Listing Rules align the voting rights between WVR holders
and non-WVR shareholders as a means of limiting the voting power of WVR
shares in certain situations. It is required that non-WVR shareholders amount-
ing to at least 10% of voting rights on a OSOV basis are able to convene
general meetings and also add resolutions to the meeting agenda.69 Further-
more, certain key matters must be voted on a OSOV basis, whereby any WVR
shares will be treated as OSOV shares. The following are the key matters to be
voted under a OSOV basis:
(1) changes to the listed issuer’s constitutional documents, however framed;
(2) variation of rights attached to any class of shares;
(3) the appointment or removal of an independent non-executive director;
(4) the appointment or removal of auditors; and
(5) the voluntary winding-up of the listed issuer.70
65Hong Kong Exchanges and Clearings Ltd (n 29) at 38.
66Hong Kong Exchanges and Clearings Ltd (n 30) at 42–43.
67HKEX Listing Rule 8A.42, at part 8A-13.
68HKEX Listing Rule 8A.41, at part 8A-13, see also Hong Kong Exchanges and Clearings Ltd (n 30) at 42.
69HKEX Listing Rule 8A.09, at part 8A-4.
70HKEX Listing Rule 8A.24, at part 8A-9.
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Essentially, this significantly limits the scope of voting power abuses by
WVR shareholders and hence, increases the monitoring effectiveness upon
the WVR shareholders. Of particular importance to corporate governance is
that independent non-executive directors (‘INEDs’) are appointed on a
OSOV basis so as to ensure the independence of these directors from the
WVR shareholders.
Second, unlike the US regime, the powers of WVR shares are comparatively
restricted to reduce the risks of increased agency cost associated withWVR com-
panies. To mitigate the disproportionality of equity interests in WVR shares, the
New Listing Rules prescribes a maximum voting power of ten times that of non-
WVR shares.71 Also, WVR shareholders must collectively own a minimum of 10%
of the economic interest of the company’s total issued share capital.72 Originally,
in the proposed WVR rules73, the requirement also included a maximum econ-
omic interest threshold of 50% of the company’s issued share capital to ‘restrict
the use of WVRs to individuals that would otherwise not be able to exercise control
over the listing applicant after listing’.74 However, market feedback was of the
view that such requirement would be unattractive and may hinder Hong
Kong’s competitiveness as a listing venue. The HKEX acknowledged such con-
cerns in light of legitimate commercial reasons for allowing WVR beneficiaries
to hold more than 50% of the economic interest of the company, such as sub-
stantial post-listing funding needs, and decided to remove the requirement in
order to ‘enable the WVR beneficiary to retain control of the issuer post-listing’.75
Moreover, WVR shares can only be benefited with enhanced voting rights for
resolution on general meetings and in all other aspects, the rights of WVR and
non-WVR shares must be equivalent.76 This limits the variance of inconsistent
rights attached to companies as seen in the US. Additionally, to obstruct the
applicant company in increasing the rights of WVR shares after listing, the
New Listing Rules restricts any post-listing alterations of the terms of WVR
shares with the effect of increasing their rights.77
Third, the New Listing Rules restrict WVR shareholders to only individuals of
the board of director of the applicant company with specific sunset clauses.78
To ensure that only directors can benefit from WVR shares, it is required that
upon the transfer of WVR shares79 these shares will be converted to normal
non-WVR shares on a proportionate basis.80 Similarly, where the holder of
71HKEX Listing Rule 8A.10, at part 8A-4.
72HKEX Listing Rule 8A.12, at part 8A-5.
73Hong Kong Exchanges and Clearings Ltd (n 29) at 35.
74ibidHong Kong Exchanges and Clearings Ltd (n 30) at 38–39.
75ibid.
76HKEX Listing Rule 8A.07, at part 8A-4.
77HKEX Listing Rule 8A.16, at part 8A-6.
78HKEX Listing Rule 8A.11, at part 8A-4.
79HKEX Listing Rule 8A.18, at part 8A-7.
80HKEX Listing Rule 8A.21, at part 8A-8.
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WVR shares is deceased, ceases to be a director, deemed by the SEHK to be
incapacitated, or to no longer meet the requirement of a director, the WVRs
of those shares will be ceased.81 The effect is to attach fiduciary duties to
holders of WVR shares to prevent them from acting against the best interest
of the company such as engaging in expropriation activities. Further, this can
ensure that WVR shareholders are the managing individuals who provide the
material contributions to the long-term innovative success of the company.
Hence, allowing these companies to fully capitalise on the benefits of WVR
shares to utilise the proprietary visionary abilities of their management
body. Additionally, this also alleviates the entrenchment risks of the ‘next gen-
eration’ problem, as the successors of the original directors would not be
benefited with WVR shares.
Finally, to strengthen the monitoring function in WVR companies, the HKEX
requires applicants to establish a Corporate Governance Committee, which is
chaired by and consists entirely of INEDs, with the objective of ensuring that
the company is operated for the benefit of all shareholders.82 In the proposal
stage of the WVR rules, the original condition only required that the Corporate
Governance Committee to be composed of a majority of INEDs.83 Taking into
account the market’s concern that the corporate governance safeguards
should be strengthened, the HKEX amended the rules to require that all
members should be INEDs.84 The Corporate Governance Committee must
also disclose a Corporate Governance Report on a semi-annual basis, summar-
ising of the work that it has done.85 As INEDs are voted on a OSOV basis, this
alleviates the WVR risks regarding INEDs and thus they can safeguard share-
holder interests in board-level decisions. In addition, WVR companies will
need to have Nomination Committees chaired and comprised of a majority
of INEDs for the purpose of nominating INEDs to the board86, ensuring that
INED nominations stay fully independent. Furthermore, WVR companies will
need to engage a compliance advisor on a permanent basis to advise on
any WVR-related problems such as potential conflict of interests between
WVR management and non-WVR shareholders.87
To give force to the requirements, there is an additional requirement for
WVR companies to incorporate all the requirements in the HKEX Listing
Rule chapter 8A into the company’s articles of association.88 As the articles
serve as the contractual documentation binding the company management
and the shareholders, any breach of the terms in the articles serves as a
81HKEX Listing Rule 8A.17, at part 8A-6–8A-7.
82HKEX Listing Rule 8A.31, at part 8A-11.
83Hong Kong Exchanges and Clearings Ltd (n 29) at 38.
84Hong Kong Exchanges and Clearings Ltd (n 30) at 45.
85HKEX Listing Rule 8A.32, at part 8A-11.
86HKEX Listing Rule 8A.27 and Rule 8A.28, at part 8A-10, and section A5, Appendix 14.
87HKEX Listing Rule 8A.33 and Rule 8A.34, at part 8A-11–8A-12.
88HKEX Listing Rule 8A.44, at part 8A-13.
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breach of contract which shareholders can sue upon. This creates an
additional cause of action for shareholders to receive remedies personally.
4.1.2. Ex post mechanisms
There is currently no contingency fee and class action framework in Hong
Kong, which is viewed to act as a deterrent to management abuses.89 The
only similar form of aggregate litigation is through representative proceed-
ings under Order 15, Rule 12 of the Rules of the High Court (Cap 4A).
However, this has been criticised as inadequate and too restrictive, particularly
where the case involves a large class of claimants.90 Indeed, although the SFO
allows individual shareholders to sue for damages after incurring a loss as a
result of market misconduct, there have not been any such lawsuits reported
to date.91
4.2. Singapore
4.2.1. Ex ante mechanisms
On 28 March 2018, the Singapore Exchange (‘SGX’) published their second
consultation paper on the ‘Proposed Listing Framework for Dual Class Share
Structures’92 which sets out the proposed rules for implementing their WVR
regime. On 26 June 2018, the SGX published the finalised WVR listing rules
(‘Singaporean WVR rules’) after incorporating market feedback with immedi-
ate effect.93 As with Hong Kong, Singapore puts in place relevant measures
to mitigate the risks associated with WVR structures, which have now been
incorporated into the SGX Mainboard Listing Rules. Unlike Hong Kong,
however, the WVR rules are not contained in a single new chapter, but
rather are scattered around several chapters, including Chapters Two, Six,
Seven, Eight and Twelve, with the bulk of the core WVR requirements inserted
as subsection 10 of Rule 210 under Chapter Two, titled ‘Dual Class Share
Structure’.94
4.2.1.1. Entry requirements. The Singaporean WVR rules obligate additional
entry requirements for WVR companies in terms of qualitative suitability
only. Originally, like the Hong Kong law, there was a proposed minimum
89Hong Kong Exchanges and Clearings Ltd (n 9) at 22.
90K Dicks, ‘The Proposed Class Action Regime for Hong Kong’ Deacons (19 June 2012), at http://www.
deacons.com.hk/news-and-insights/publications/the-proposed-class-action-regime-for-hong-kong.html.
91SFO, ss281, 305.
92Singapore Exchange, ‘Proposed Listing Framework for Dual Class Share Structures’ (2018).
93Singapore Exchange, ‘SGX Launches Rules for Listing of Dual Class Shares Companies’ News and Updates
(26 June 2018), at https://www.sgx.com/wps/wcm/connect/sgx_en/home/higlights/news_releases/sgx_
launches_rules_for_listing_of_dual_class_shares_companies.
94Rule 210(10), SGX Mainboard Rules.
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market capitalisation rule, however such additional requirement has been
abandoned because a majority of market respondents objected to heigh-
tened admission requirements for WVR structures. As such, the SGX’s main
board quantitative requirements apply equally to WVR companies.
With respect to qualitative suitability, the Singaporean WVR rules require
that only new issuers are to be permitted to adopt WVR structures and that
it will publish further guidance on suitability factors after it has received
and reviewed a sufficient number of potential applications for WVR struc-
tures.95 However, at this initial stage, the SGX listed six qualitative factors
that may be taken into account in the suitability assessment for WVR applicant
issuers.96 These are as follows:
(1) the business model of the applicant, for example, that the applicant has a
conceptualised long-term plan that contemplates ramping up growth at a
fast pace
(2) the applicant issuer’s track record, including operating track record of the
company, business or group97
(3) the role and contribution of WVR shareholders to the success of the appli-
cant issuer. In case of a permitted holder group (as explained below), its
relevance to the business or group
(4) the participation of sophisticated investors
(5) if the permitted holder group is a trust or corporate vehicle, the suitability
of the arrangement, including an assessment of whether sunset features
or other safeguards are in place to govern the holding structure
(6) other features of the applicant issuer that require a WVR structure
Further, as an additional review of WVR listing applications, pursuant to
Rule 110(4)(a) of the SGX Mainboard Rules, the Listing Advisory Committee
will be referred to provide advice on the applicant’s WVR safeguards for
initial cases which involve unprecedented issues.98
4.2.1.2. Disclosure requirements. The Singaporean WVR rules include
additional disclosure requirements specifically for WVR companies to increase
the clarity to investors. The rules require WVR issuers to include a statement
95Singapore Exchange (n 92) at 2.
96These qualitative factors are not found in the SGX Mainboard Listing Rules, but are listed in the consul-
tation conclusions paper as the factors that the SGX may take account of. Singapore Exchange,
‘Responses to Comments on Consultation Paper: Proposed Listing Framework for Dual Class Share Struc-
tures’ (2018) at 10–11.
97In its proposed rules, the SGX initially only included operating track record. However, after reviewing
market feedback, the SGX considered it relevant to also take into account other factors such as corporate
governance track record and also to expand the track record scope to not only the issue but also com-
panies also managed by the issuer’s founder(s) as well. Singapore Exchange (n 96) at 4–5.
98ibid at 4 and Singapore Exchange (n 92) at 2.
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on the cover page of its annual report to cover the following details pertaining
to each holder of WVR shares:
(1) the name of the shareholder
(2) the number of WVR shares
(3) the total voting rights of the WVR shares
(4) the number of non-WVR shares
(5) the total voting rights of non-WVR shares
(6) the total voting rights of both WVR and non-WVR shares99
Furthermore, the applicant issuer must prominently disclose in its prospec-
tus, offering memorandum, introductory document and shareholder’s circular,
the details of the WVR structure and its associated risks, its rationale for adopt-
ing it, key matters that are subject to enhanced voting rights and their impli-
cations to non-WVR shareholders, key provisions in its constitutional
documents relating to WVR shares and also the six details relating to each
holder of WVR shares (as also applicable to annual reports above).100 To
clearly distinguish WVR companies from non-WVR ones, the rules require a
prominent statement emphasising that the company is a WVR company on
the cover page of its prospectus, offering memorandum, introductory docu-
ment and shareholder’s circular101, and on a continuing basis, in its announce-
ments102, any other circulars103 and annual reports.104 As part of its earlier
proposals to the WVR regime, the SGX aims to enhance the awareness of
WVR companies by requiring WVR stocks to be clearly identified on trading
screens and will also conduct educational measures for investors.105
4.2.1.3. Safeguard requirements. To protect shareholders against the expro-
priation and entrenchment risks related to WVR structures, the SGX imposed
the following eight safeguard requirements.
First, maximum voting differential. To limit the voting inequality between
WVR and non-WVR shares, the SGX imposes a maximum of ten votes per
WVR share and that the voting ratio between WVR and non-WVR shares
cannot be altered after listing.106
Second, a moratorium on the transfer of shareholdings by WVR holders. To
ensure that holders of WVR shares do not suddenly abandon their commit-
ment to the WVR company and to align their interest to the non-WVR
99Rule 1207(i), SGX Mainboard Rules.
100Rule 610(10), SGX Mainboard Rules.
101Rule 610(10)(a), SGX Mainboard Rules.
102Rule 753, SGX Mainboard Rules.
103Rule 1206(7), SGX Mainboard Rules.
104Rule 1207(9)(i), SGX Mainboard Rules.
105Singapore Exchange (n 92) at 7.
106Rule 210(10)(d), SGX Mainboard Rules.
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shareholders107, the SGX requires that holders of WVR shares must give con-
tractual undertakings to adhere to a moratorium on the transfer or disposal of
their entire shareholdings in the WVR issuer at the time of listing for at least
12 months after listing.108
Third, protected rights of non-WVR shareholders. To protect the rights of
non-WVR shareholders in voicing their opinions in general meetings and to
avoid disenfranchisement, the rules require that non-WVR shareholders
holding a minimum of 10% of the voting rights on a OSOV basis are able to
convene a general meeting.109 In its proposal stage, the SGX sought market
feedback on its other option of requiring the 10% threshold to be counted
under by the total voting rights of all shares instead of by an OSOV
basis.110 However, after an overwhelming majority of feedback being
against such an option, the SGX went forth with the OSOV basis in the end.111
Fourth, restriction on post-listing WVR share issuance. To avoid further
entrenchment, the SGX rules prohibit any further issuance of WVR shares
unless by a rights issue, bonus issue, scrip dividend scheme or the consolidation
or subdivision of shares, with each casebeing in conjunctionwith the issuance of
non-WVR shares.112 Further, any corporate actions such as those mentioned
above, must not increase the ratio of voting rights of WVR shares against non-
WVR shares prior to such corporate action.113 Further, any issuance of WVR
sharesmust beapprovedunder a special resolutionheld in a generalmeeting.114
Fifth, automatic conversion of WVR shares upon transfers. WVR share-
holders are limited to a ‘responsible director’ or a group of persons or
entity within the ‘permitted holder group’ of the issuer applicant.115 In
addition, the holders of the WVR shares must be specified at the IPO stage
and in the case of a ‘permitted holder group’, the scope of the ‘permitted
holder group’must also be specified at IPO stage.116 Originally in the proposal
stage, the SGX required only directors of the issuer to hold WVR shares so as to
limit holders of WVR shares to individuals who are subject to fiduciary duties
to add extra protection upon minority shareholders.117 Yet the SGX recog-
nised that where a group of founders wish to collectively become holders
of WVR shares, it may be impractical to require all of them to be directors
as each of them may have different roles towards the growth of the
107Rule 225, SGX Mainboard Rules.
108Rule 229A, SGX Mainboard Rules.
109Rule 210(10)(g), SGX Mainboard Rules.
110Singapore Exchange (n 92) at 4.
111Singapore Exchange (n 96) at 6.
112Rule 803A(1), SGX Mainboard Rules.
113Rule 803A(3), SGX Mainboard Rules.
114Rule 803A(2), SGX Mainboard Rules.
115Rule 210(10)(e), SGX Mainboard Rules.
116Rule 210(10)(c), SGX Mainboard Rules.
117Singapore Exchange (n 92) at 5.
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issuer.118 Consequently, the SGX devised the ‘permitted holder group’ to give
flexibility to a group of persons or entity to collectively hold WVR shares of the
issuer.119
There are also automatic conversion provisions that, upon certain triggering
events, will automatically convert WVR shares into non-WVR shares on a OSOV
basis, unless specifically approved by shareholders through the enhanced
voting process (as explained below).120 The triggering events are as follows:
(1) where the WVR share is sold or transferred to any person, and in the case
of a permitted holder group, any person not within the group
(2) where a responsible director ceases to be a director (whether through
death, incapacity, retirement, resignation or otherwise), and in the case
of a permitted holder group, other than where a new responsible director
is appointed
If enhanced voting processes are undertaken, the relevant holder of the
WVR shares, the person whom is to be sold or transferred the WVR shares,
and such responsible director or their associates must abstain from voting
in such resolutions.
Sixth, enhanced independence of board committees. To confirm the inde-
pendence of board committees, thereby ensuring accountability and oversight,
the SGX rules require that the audit, nominating and remuneration committees
must be composed of a majority of INEDs and also chaired by an INED.121
Seventh, enhanced voting process for key matters. Similar to the Hong
Kong regime, certain key matters must be voted upon through an ‘enhanced
voting process’, which is conducted under a OSOV basis.122
Finally, constitutional backing of the new rules. The SGX rules also require
that the issuer must incorporate some of the provisions regarding WVR struc-
tures, namely Rules 210(10)(c) to 210(10)(i) of the SGX Mainboard Rules, into
its articles of association and other constitutional documents.123
4.1.3. Ex post mechanisms
As with Hong Kong, Singapore does not have a class action and contingency
fee system. Although there are a number of procedures that may aggregate
multiple claims, they are not effective in practice.124 For instance, the court
can decide to consolidate proceedings or try multiple claims on the same
118Singapore Exchange (n 96) at 10.
119ibid.
120Rule 210(10)(f), SGX Mainboard Rules.
121Rule 210(10)(i), SGX Mainboard Rules.
122Rule 730B, SGX Mainboard Rules.
123Rule 210(10)(j), SGX Mainboard Rules.
124Alexander FH Loke, ‘Mounting Hurdles in Securities Litigation: Addressing the Funding and Collective
Action Issue’ (2010) 22 Singapore Academy of Law Journal 660.
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occasion if there is some common question of law or fact,125 but the condition
is that the plaintiffs must have consciously chosen to participate in the litiga-
tion. Further, similar to Hong Kong, Singapore allows the representative pro-
ceeding in which a litigant may sue on behalf of another without necessarily
having obtained the consent of the latter, but there is a ‘same interest’
requirement which is overly restrictive and has impeded the efficacy of the
procedure.126
4.3. The United States
4.3.1. Ex ante mechanisms
There are multiple stock exchanges in the United Stated (‘US’), but for the
purpose of this analysis, only the two largest exchanges, the NYSE and the
NASDAQ are taken into consideration. Despite being the most prominent
WVR structure jurisdiction, the US has minimal additional requirements for
WVR companies under the rules of both the NYSE and NASDAQ.
4.3.1.1. Entry requirements. In general, neither the NYSE nor the NADAQ has
additional entry requirements specifically for WVR companies. However, they
both adopt a rule that substantially restricts the freedom of companies to
reduce the voting power of outstanding shares by the issuance of super
voting stocks.127 The restriction on issuing super voting stock is primarily
applicable to the issuance of a new class of stock. Hence, this effectively
means that only new issuers can adopt the WVR structure.
4.3.1.2. Disclosure requirements. Both the listing rules of the NYSE or
NASDAQ do not have additional disclosure requirements specifically for
WVR companies.
4.3.1.3. Safeguard requirements. Asnotedearlier, both theNYSEandNASDAQ
prohibit the post-listing reduction of voting rights of existing shareholders of
publicly traded common stock.128 This means that a listed WVR company
cannot further issue more WVR shares that would reduce voting rights of exist-
ing shareholders. However, companieswith existingWVR structureswould gen-
erally be permitted to issue additional shares of the existing super-voting stock,
provided that voting rights of existing shareholders will not be reduced.
Further, under theNYSE ListedCompanyManual, additional safeguardsmust
beprovided toholders of non-voting shares. These are (1) anynon-voting shares
must meet all original listing standards, (2) the rights attached to non-voting
125Rules of Court (Cap 322), Order 15, Rule 4; Order 4, Rule 1.
126Rules of Court (Cap 322), Order 15, Rule 12.
127NYSE Listed Company Manual, Rule 313(A) and NASDAQ Stock Market Rule 5640.
128NYSE Listed Company Manual, Rule 313(A) and NASDAQ Stock Market Rule 5640.
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shares should be substantially the same as other shares except for voting rights,
and (3) holders of any listed non-voting common shares must receive all com-
munications, including proxy material, sent generally to the holders of the
normal voting shares.129 The NASDAQ listing rules however do not have
similar additional safeguards for holders of non-voting shares.
4.1.4. Ex post mechanisms
The key feature of the US legal framework for aggrieved shareholders is the
availability of class actions coupled with contingency fee system. The legal
environment in the US is well known to be highly litigious. In 2017, there
were a total of 432 shareholder actions, making it one of the most litigious
class-action years since a federal law preventing frivolous actions took
effect back in 1995.130 In relative terms, the ease of action in the US is
rather high, meaning that there is a higher tendency for aggrieved share-
holders to obtain remedial damages from WVR share abuses. However, it
has been observed that there is also an increase in poor quality lawsuits
that are often dismissed or settled for minimal sums.131
4.4. Canada
4.4.1. Ex ante mechanisms
Canada’s largest stock exchange, the Toronto Stock Exchange (‘TSX’) permits
the listing of companies with WVR shares. Compared to the US, there are more
requirements for WVR companies, albeit still minimal.
4.4.1.1. Entry requirements. The TSX listing rules do not have additional entry
requirements specifically for WVR companies. However, a listed company is
not allowed to issue any securities that have voting rights greater than
those of its existing voting securities, unless the issuance is made to all
holders of the existing voting securities on a pro rata basis.132 This means
that a non-WVR listed company cannot adopt the WVR structure to favour
selected shareholders and thus the WVR structure is in effect confined to
new issuers.
4.4.1.2. Disclosure requirements. Under the TSX rules, there are stock symbol
designations for company shares with different voting rights that must be dis-
played in all security certificates.133 For example, the words of ‘restricted
129NYSE Listed Company Manual, Rule 313(B)
130J Stampel, ‘A Lawsuit a Day: U.S. Securities Class Actions Soar’, Reuters (31 January 2018), at https://
www.reuters.com/article/us-stocks-classaction/a-lawsuit-a-day-u-s-securities-class-actions-soar-
idUSKBN1FI2FM?il=0.
131ibid.
132TSX Company Manual, Part VI (H), Section 624(m)
133TSX Company Manual, Part VI (H), Section 624(c) - (f)
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voting’will be displayed for restricted voting class of shares.134 This serves as a
minimal differentiation mechanism for interested investors.
4.4.1.3. Safeguard requirements. Listed WVR companies may make a further
issuance of multiple-voting securities that would maintain (but not increase)
the percentage voting position of a holder of multiple-voting securities,
subject to relevant conditions as the TSX considers desirable in any particular
case.135 One of the conditions is minority approval of security holders, which
means approval given by a majority of the votes cast by shareholders exclud-
ing the promoters, directors, officers, insiders of an issuer or proposed recipi-
ent of such shares.136 This requirement is intended to prevent transactions
which would reduce the voting power of existing security holders through
the use of securities carrying multiple voting rights.
Further, the TSX imposes coattail provisions that ensures holders of
inferior-voting shares to participate in a take-over bid on equal terms as
those with superior-voting shares.137 Such coattail provisions need to meet
different criteria, depending on the circumstances under which the shares
are traded,138 and be cleared prior to listing with the TSX.139
4.1.5. Ex post mechanisms
The Canadian legal framework also allows for class actions and contingency
fee system – much like the US. However, unlike the US, the number of secu-
rities class action is significantly fewer. According to a recent report, only six
new securities class actions were filed in 2017 and four of those were
actions against a public company.140 Further, from 2015 to 2017, only 14
TSX-listed companies were sued in a securities class action.141
5. Evaluating the Hong Kong WVR regime
As discussed above, the four jurisdictions examined in this study, namely Hong
Kong, Singapore, the US and Canada, have in place different WVR-supporting
mechanisms. For clarity of comparison, they are summarised in Table 1.
This part will proceed to compare the WVR supporting mechanisms ex ante
and ex post in the four jurisdictions, and draw difference between the analyti-
cal frameworks discussed earlier, identify the legal strategies being utilised to
134TSX Company Manual, Part VI (H), Section 624(c)(iii)
135TSX Company Manual, Part VI (H), Section 624(m)
136TSX Company Manual, Part VI (H), Section 624(n)
137TSX Company Manual, Part VI (H), Section 624(I)
138ibid Section 624(I) (1) and (2).
139ibid.
140B Heys and R Patton, ‘Trends in Canadian Securities Class Actions: 2017 Update: Trickle of New Cases
Suggests a Slow Rate of Filings Is the New Norm’, NERA, (20 February 2018) at 3, at http://www.nera.
com/content/dam/nera/publications/2018/PUB_2017_Recent_Trends_Canada_0218.pdf.
141ibid.
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reduce the WVR agency costs. Based on this, we will evaluate the WVR regime
in Hong Kong, particularly in its local context.
5.1. A generally positive development for Hong Kong
5.1.1. Ex ante supporting mechanisms in HK are well-designed
As discussed earlier, the new WVR regime in Hong Kong adopts a large
number of new listing requirements that are specifically designed to control
controlling shareholders’ opportunism. These ex ante WVR supporting mech-
anisms are broadly grouped into three categories, namely entry requirements,
disclosure requirements and safeguard requirements.142 Below is an anatomy
of these requirements according to the taxonomy of legal strategies for redu-
cing agency costs as noted earlier.143
To start with, the entry requirements primarily embody the affiliation strat-
egy by permitting only new issuers to use the WVR structure and setting out a
list of selection criteria. This allows the investors to freely decide ex ante
whether they want to join a WVR company, and ensures that the investors
will be able to contract with a WVR company on a set of mandatory terms.
In designing the listing criteria, the HKEX uses both clear-cut rules such as
financial tests and flexible standards such as character tests. It also adds
legal constraints by requiring the WVR shareholder to be a director of the
issuer so as to apply directors’ fiduciary duties. Although there exist some con-
ventional methods to constrain controlling shareholders under Hong Kong
company law, such as the unfair prejudice remedy (also known as oppression
remedy) and the equitable constraint on abuse of majority voting, they are
not as powerful as the directors’ fiduciary duties.144
Further, the safeguard requirements make use of several different legal
strategies to deal with the agency problems caused by the WVR structure.
The legal strategy of decision rights is used in two forms here. On the one
hand, non-WVR shareholders can exercise voting rights on certain major
transactions; on the other, as all the new listing requirements are automati-
cally incorporated into the company’s constitution, non-WVR shareholders
have a new basis for bringing suit against WVR-shareholders. The incentive
strategy, particularly trusteeship, is applied in the form of the heavier reliance
put on independent directors and the new requirement of the corporate gov-
ernance committee. The strategy of legal constraints manifests itself in certain
rules such as the maximum voting power that can be attached to one WVR
share and the minimum economic interest that WVR shareholders must
hold. Among the five types of legal strategies commonly used for reducing
142See above Part 4.1.1.
143See above Part 3.2.
144Hong Kong Companies Ordinance, s724.
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agency costs, the pair of selection and removal rights are largely absent,
because the very purpose of the WVR structure is to allow WVR-shareholders
to pursue long-term business goals without much fear of removal. Yet, Hong
Kong has tried to introduce relevant sunset provisions under which WVR pri-
vileges will cease to exist.
Finally, the disclosure requirements provide the information necessary to
protect non-WVR shareholders as a powerful regulatory strategy in itself or
through other mechanisms including the entry requirements and safeguard
requirements as discussed above. For instance, the investors can better exer-
cise their affiliation rights, to the extent that the WVR company needs to
clearly identify itself and disclose information on its WVR structure and
other major issues. This is important for protecting the investors as they
can make an informed decision on entering the company and at a market
price which usually reflects the existence of the WVR structure.
From a comparative perspective, the ex ante WVR-supporting mechanisms
in Hong Kong are the most comprehensive and stringent among the four jur-
isdictions examined in this paper. While the WVR regime in Singapore is
broadly modelled on that in Hong Kong, some of the requirements are
revised to become more relaxed.145 For example, unlike Hong Kong, Singa-
pore does not strictly confine the WVR structure to ‘innovative’ company;
nor does it adopt the market capitalisation requirement. Further, the WVR
shareholding in Hong Kong is restricted only to individuals who serve as direc-
tors of the company. This requirement effectively casts the WVR shareholders
in a dual role, namely WVR shareholders cum directors, ensuring that the WVR
power can only be accorded to ingenious entrepreneurs deeply involved in
the management of the company and its exercise is subject to the constraints
of the fiduciary duties. However, Singapore drops the above restriction to
allow the route of ‘permitted holder group’ under which multiple individuals
can choose to hold WVR shares through a special purpose vehicle. This would
add a further layer of agency problems and lose the benefit of using the
powerful tool of the fiduciary duties to control WVR-shareholders.
Table 1. Jurisdictional comparison of WVR supporting mechanisms.
Jurisdictions
Ex ante mechanisms Ex post mechanisms
Entry
requirement
Disclosure
requirement
Safeguard
requirement
Class action and
contingency fee
Hong Kong Yes Yes Yes No
Singapore Yes Yes Yes No
US No No Minimal Yes
Canada No Minimal Minimal Yes
145See above Part 4.2.1.
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In comparison, the Hong Kong-style ex ante WVR-supporting mechanisms
are not found in the US and Canada.146 Compared to the US, Canada has more
requirements, particularly in relation to the disclosure and safeguard aspects,
which are designed to reduce problems and thus litigations.147 This may help
explain why, as will be discussed below, both jurisdictions allow for contin-
gency fee and class actions, but the number of litigations in the US is signifi-
cantly higher than that in Canada. Hence, we should have a holistic view of the
ex ante and ex post supporting mechanisms in a given jurisdiction. Plausibly,
the significantly more stringent ex ante WVR requirements in Hong Kong may
reduce the chance of the WVR shareholders abusing their power and thus the
need for judicial remedies ex post.
5.1.2. HK lacks US-style ex post mechanisms but has functional
substitutes
The predominant limitation to the ex post protection framework in Hong Kong
is the unavailability of class actions and contingency fee system. As argued by
opponents of WVR, the lack of class action in Hong Kong deprives investors
the ease of taking legal remedies in the event of misconduct by WVR compa-
nies and thus disapproves the implementation of WVR regime in Hong
Kong.148 However, despite the lack of class action, Hong Kong has functionally
similar mechanisms under the SFO. A prime example is s213 under which the
SFC can bring the so-called ‘surrogate action’ to seek compensation on behalf
of and for aggrieved investors.
In the recent 2013 landmark case of Securities and Futures Commission v
Tiger Asia (‘Tiger Asia’)149, it is confirmed that the SFC can use s213 to seek
a court determination of market misconduct and final orders for shareholder
remedies. This allows the SFC to bring an action regarding a potential event of
market misconduct on behalf of the aggrieved shareholders. In effect, section
213 acts as the ‘public analogue’ of the private route of action under section
305150, thus expanding the ‘ammunition’ of the SFC in combating market mis-
conduct and protecting investors. As stated by SFC’s former Executive Director
of Enforcement, Mr Mark Steward, section 213 can play a helpful role
in situations where individual actions are difficult to commence due to the
146See above Parts 4.3 and 4.4.
147See e.g. S Tinaikar, ‘Executive Compensation Disclosure and Private Control Benefits: A Comparison of
U.S. and Canadian Dual Class Firms’ (2017) 29 Journal of International Accounting, Auditing and Taxa-
tion 32–51.
148RS Chan and JKS Ho, ‘Should Listed Companies Be Allowed to Adopt Dual-Class Share Structure in Hong
Kong?’ (2014) 43 Common Law World Review 155, 178; Kong Shan Ho, ‘Revisiting the Viability to Allow
Dual-Class Share Structure Companies to List in the Financial Market of Hong Kong’ (2018) 47 Common
Law World Review 167.
149[2013] HKEC 703.
150ibid.
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anonymity of market wrongdoers or where the individual quantum of
damages is too insignificant to justify an action.151
Since the Tiger Asia case in 2013, the SFC has had an impressive track
record of successful actions under section 213 with substantial payouts to
aggrieved shareholders.152 For example, in the recent case of Securities and
Futures Commission v Qunxing Paper Holdings Co Ltd (No 2)153, the court
granted compensation orders totalling HKD 1.42 billion under section 213
against Qunxing Paper Holdings Company Limited along with a few of its
senior members as well as its subsidiary Best Known Group Limited, to com-
pensate investors of Qunxing shares due to findings of false and misleading
disclosures in Qunxing’s IPO prospectus. Further, in the case of Securities
and Futures Commission v Sun Min154, the Court of First Instance made a res-
toration order under section 213 against Ms Sun Min to pay HKD 15.6 million
to 51 investors who suffered from her misconduct of insider dealing.
Hence, from a functional perspective, public enforcement by the SFC has
served as a meaningful substitute for private enforcement in the form of
class action, thereby affording strong investor protection in Hong Kong.155
In fact, the s213 mechanism in Hong Kong has some competitive advantages
vis-à-vis the class action in the US. To start with, the aggrieved shareholders in
Hong Kong do not need to take the trouble and cost to litigate, as the SFC acts
as the plaintiff in such cases. Yet, the remedies are payable to the aggrieved
shareholders and not to the SFC.156 In addition, s213 offers a wide range of
court orders to protect investors, including the freezing order, the disqualifi-
cation order and the restoration order.157 To be sure, the efficacy of the
s213 depends essentially on the integrity and capacity of the SFC, but as
noted above, the SFC has had a demonstrable record of using s213 actively
to protect investors. Empirical research suggests that the investors in Hong
Kong have benefitted from SFC surrogate actions (such as section 213
actions), received larger compensations than US investors who sought
redress through class actions.158
Furthermore, the importance of class action in protecting investors in the
context of the WVR structure may seem to be somewhat exaggerated. In
151M Steward, ‘Legal Week’s Corporate Counsel Forum’ Securities and Futures Commission (11 June 2013),
at https://www.sfc.hk/web/EN/files/ER/PDF/Speeches/Mark_20130611.pdf.
152See Y Hu, ‘The Role of Public Enforcement in Investor Compensation: A Hong Kong Perspective’ (2017)
46 Common Law World Review 216–38, at 228–29; DC Donald and PWH Cheuk, ‘Hong Kong’s Public
Enforcement Model of Investor Protection’ (2017) 4 Asian Journal of Law and Society 349–85, at 375.
153[2018] HKCFI 271.
154[2017] HKEC 1479.
155Robin Hui Huang, Hailong Li and Gavin Yao Lin, ‘The Anatomy of Securities Class Action in China: A
Functional and Comparative Approach With the United States’ (2018) 4 Securities Regulation Law
Journal 365, 387.
156See section 213(2)(b), Securities and Futures Ordinance (Cap. 571)
157See sections 213(2)(a) to (g), Securities and Futures Ordinance (Cap. 571)
158Hu (n 152) 216–38, at 229.
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the US, empirical data show that most of the securities class actions are
related to problematic disclosure issues instead of abuse of power under
the WVR structure.159 In Canada, as discussed earlier, despite the availability
of class action, the actual number of securities class actions is very small.
This suggests that even if class action were to be allowed in Hong Kong, it
might not function as vigorously as expected.
Finally, apart from s213 which is focused on market misconduct, there are
several other SFO provisions under which the SFC can bring surrogate action
to protect investors. For instance, the SFC can use s212 to obtain a winding-up
order. Under s214, the SFC can bring action to seek remedies for unfair preju-
dice to the shareholders caused by directors and controlling shareholders in
the operation of the company. S214 has been used by the SFC in practice
to effectively substitute for unfair prejudice action and derivative action
usually brought by shareholders.160 Together, these various types of surrogate
action may provide a functional equivalent to the US class action in protecting
investors.
5.1.3. Putting the cost-benefit analysis in the HK context
When evaluating the WVR structure in Hong Kong, it is important to put the
cost–benefit analysis into context. Indeed, the real question is whether and
how Hong Kong has managed to find ways to reduce the agency costs
while reaping the benefits. As discussed earlier, the ex ante WVR-supporting
mechanisms established in Hong Kong are generally well-designed and the
most stringent among its counterparts in the jurisdictions examined in this
paper. It utilises a combination of cost-reducing legal strategies, including
agent constraints, affiliation terms, incentive alignment, appointment rights
and decision rights. Hong Kong also has effective enforcement strategies as
ex post supporting mechanisms.
While the costs and benefits of the WVR structure are difficult to measure in
quantitative terms, they are affected by local conditions and one needs to a
contextual analysis when weighing them up. For instance, the entrenchment
risks as created by the WVR structure in Hong Kong seem to be less of a worry
than that in the US, because for various reasons such as the family-controlled
pattern of most listed companies and the stringent law for hostile takeovers,
the market for corporate control in Hong Kong has long been far from
effective with a dearth of hostile takeovers.161
159Cornerstone Research, Securities Class Action Filings 2017 Year in Review (2017), 9.
160See e.g. Re Styland Holdings Ltd (2012). From a comparative perspective, the unfair prejudice action in
Hong Kong performs a similar function to the controlling shareholders’ fiduciary duties in the US.
161As one of the main reasons for using the WVR structure in the US is to ward off the threat of hostile
takeovers, an interesting question may arise why Hong Kong-listed companies still want the WVR struc-
ture given the weak market for hostile takeovers in Hong Kong. Several considerations may help explain
it. First, for innovative high-tech companies which the WVR structure is mainly designed for, they
usually have multiple rounds of fundraising and the founders’ shareholdings are diluted along the
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Further, in relation to the increased competitiveness of the market in Hong
Kong, not only may a WVR regime help to enhance HKEX’s attractiveness to
issuers, it may also serve to diversify the demographic of listed companies
both in terms of industry and place of origin. One major concern for the
Hong Kong capital market is that there is a heavy concentration of companies
from the property and financial sectors. These two dominating industries rep-
resent a substantial 44% of the market capitalisation of the SEHK, while on the
other hand, the fast-growth new economy companies amount to only 3%, as
of 2017.162 Compared to US markets which allows for WVR such as the
NASDAQ and NYSE, the concentration of new economy companies in terms
of market capitalisation percentage in these bourses are significantly larger,
coming at 60% and 47% respectively.163 These figures show that companies
from the high-tech and innovative sectors can be substantial and Hong
Kong is far behind its competitors in attracting them. Further, Hong Kong
needs to do more to promote innovation to maintain competitive advantage.
According to the Global Innovation Index 2018, Hong Kong ranked 14th,
which is much lower than the US (6th) and Singapore (5th).164
Since new economy companies particularly favour WVR structures, a WVR
regime will accordingly increase Hong Kong’s suitability as a listing venue.
Hong Kong’s efforts to introduce the WVR structure have already started to
bear fruit. Just three days after the HKEX 2018 New Listing Rules came into
effect, the Mainland-based smartphone manufacturer, Xiaomi Corp., sub-
mitted its application for listing. Xiaomi was officially listed on 9 July 2018
to become the first listed company under the new WVR regime, which was
followed by Meituan Dianping on 20 September 2018. Going forward, Hong
Kong stands to benefit from further potential listings of Mainland Unicorn
companies.
In a sense, the significance of the introduction of the WVR structure in Hong
Kong can be best illustrated in the flurry of responses of its competitors
including Singapore and Mainland China. As noted earlier, Singapore followed
suit soon after Hong Kong decided to allow WVR listings. The same is true of
Mainland China. At the beginning of 2018, the China Securities Regulatory
way. Hence, it is very hard, or close to impossible, for the founders to retain more than 50% of shares so
as to have absolute control of the control. Second, even if it is possible for the founders to keep more
than 50% of shares, it would be economically more attractive for them if absolute control of the
company could be obtained without the need to have the proportionate equity capital locked up in
the company. Finally, in practice, although one may not need to have more than 50% shareholding
to control a listed company, the control is not absolute, and it may be susceptible to hostile takeovers
by outsiders, or challenges from existing shareholders. Hence, HKEX considers the WVR structure as
‘incentive mechanisms’ for founders of start-ups in that it protects start-ups from hostile takeovers.
HKEX, Hong Kong’s Listing Regime Enters New Era, Featuring Emerging and Innovative Firms (November
2018).
162ibid at 11.
163ibid.
164World Intellectual Property Organization, Global Innovation Index 2018 (July 2018).
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Commission (‘CSRC’) announced that one of its work priorities is to reform the
listing regime, providing more support to ‘new economy’ companies. In late
March 2018, the CSRC rolled out a pilot scheme to encourage Mainland inno-
vative ‘Unicorn’ companies to list at home through the issuance of Chinese
depository receipts (‘CDR’) that allows Chinese investors to directly purchase
securities of overseas listed companies. On June 6, 2018, the CSRC published
new rules to the pilot scheme that are said to provide the institutional foun-
dation for innovative companies to issue CDRs in the Mainland, albeit under a
set of strict selection criteria. Finally, on 5 November 2018, the Chinese Presi-
dent, Mr Xi Jingping, personally announced the plan for establishing the so-
called ‘Science and technology innovation board’ where the WVR structure
will be permitted to attract ‘new economy’ listings in Shanghai, and on 1
March 2019, the STIB was formally opened for business, adopting very
similar rules on WVR to those in Hong Kong.
5.2. Lingering concerns
5.2.1. Weaknesses of the new WVR regime
As discussed earlier, the 2018 New Listing Rules impose various entry require-
ments on WVR applicants, but there are legitimate concerns regarding their
practical effectiveness. It has been said that company size confers no assurance
that a companywill treat shareholders fairly and conversely, misconduct by large
market-capitalised companies will create even greater impact on the market.165
Further, doubt has been cast on the effectiveness of anti-circumvention
rule that ensures the use of the WVR structure by only new applicants.166
Importantly, the HKEX 2018 New Listing Rules do not include an anti-circum-
vention mechanism with regard to acquisitions of OSOV companies by a WVR
company. Under this scenario, the OSOV company operates under the control
of the parent WVR company and could lead to transfers of significant asset
from the OSOV company to the parent WVR company.
Finally, the New Listing Rule places a strong emphasis on INEDs and com-
pliance advisers to provide WVR safeguards. The HKEX respectively set out in
Listing Rules 8A.30 and 8A.34 its expectation of how INEDs and Compliance
Advisers may contribute to investors’ protection. The question to be asked
here is whether these protection rules constitute an over-reliance on INEDs
and Compliance Advisers, given the longstanding debate on the efficacy of
INEDs in Hong Kong.167
165Securities and Futures Commission, ‘SFC statement on the SEHK’s draft proposal on weighted voting
rights’, SFC News & Announcements (25 June 2015), at https://www.sfc.hk/edistributionWeb/gateway/
EN/news-and-announcements/news/doc?refNo=15PR69.
166ibid.
167The HKEX has recently published its conclusions to a consultation paper with the objective of improving
corporate governance concerns including the level of independency of INEDs. See Hong Kong
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5.2.2. Uncertainties over access of investors to WVR shares
Since the new WVR regime requires a relatively high market capitalisation, it is
likely to expect some of these WVR applicants to be included as components
in the market indices. On 7 May 2018, the Hang Seng Indexes Company
Limited announced that the coverage of the Hang Seng Composite Index
(‘HSCI’) would expand to include among others, companies with a WVR
share structure, in accordance to market feedback and endorsement by the
HSI Advisory Committee.168 Xiaomi, being the first WVR company listed in
Hong Kong, is now the constituent stock of the HSCI. In recent years, there
is an increasing popularity for passive funds to invest indices by default
without performing due diligence into the structure of the company.
Hence, the investors who dislike WVR companies can find themselves
indirectly investing in them through index tracking funds.
On the other hand, the securities exchanges in Mainland China have
recently announced that Hong Kong-listed companies with a WVR structure
such as Xiaomi, will not be included in the southbound tranche of the Main-
land-Hong Kong Stock Connect program, and thus will not be available to the
investors in Mainland.169 This would put a significant speed bump onto the
development of WVR companies in Hong Kong, given that the WVR regime
is aimedmainly at attracting listings of Mainland-based innovative companies.
If WVR companies like Xiaomi were included under the Stock Connect
program, they could have the best of both worlds: the WVR structure, maturity
and stability of Hong Kong’s capital market with a primary listing in Hong
Kong, while at the same time reach Chinese investors back home. As the
Hong Kong-listed companies included under the Stock Connect program
can be traded as if they were listed in Mainland, this can generate several
important benefits. In addition to the usual advantage of being in home
grounds, shares in the Chinese stock market may receive higher liquidity
and valuation compared to Hong Kong, with the benchmark CSI Shanghai-
Shenzhen Index trading with a ‘price to earnings ratio’ of 23 times compared
to 11 times on the HSI.170
Exchanges and Clearings Ltd, ‘Consultation Conclusions: Review of the Corporate Governance Code and
Related Listing Rules’ (2018).
168Hang Seng Indexes Company Limited, ‘Consultation Conclusions on the Eligibility of Foreign Compa-
nies, Stapled Securities and Weighted Voting Right Companies for Inclusion in the Hang Seng Compo-
site Index’, Press Releases (7 May 2018), at https://www.hsi.com.hk/static/uploads/contents/en/news/
pressRelease/20180507T000000.pdf.
169L Moon, ‘Xiaomi Shares Fall After Mainland Bourses Block Them from Chinese Investors in Stock Connect
Pool’, South China Morning Post (16 July 2018), at https://www.scmp.com/business/companies/article/
2155391/xiaomi-shares-fall-after-chinese-bourses-block-mainland-investors.
170R Mak, ‘Xiaomi IPO Escalates China’s Battle of the Bourses’ Reuters (15 June 2018), at https://www.
reuters.com/article/us-xiaomi-china-breakingviews/breakingviews-xiaomi-ipo-escalates-chinas-battle-
of-the-bourses-idUSKBN1JB0K8.
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5.2.3. Challenges for the regulators
As discussed earlier, the 2018 New Listing Rules introduces an array of sup-
porting mechanism for the WVR regime, including entry requirements, dis-
closure requirements and safeguard requirements. There can be significant
challenges for the regulators to ensure that those requirements are applied
in a consistent, fair and vigorous way.
For instance, some of the qualitative requirements of the suitability assess-
ment, such as the determination of the material contribution of WVR share-
holders towards an applicant’s growth or whether the applicant satisfies as
‘innovative’, are not entirely straightforward and thus will leave huge room
for the HKEX to exercise discretion in the decision-making process. Indeed,
some have criticised that Xiaomi, the first WVR company under the 2018
New Listing Rules, is simply China’s Apple and not sufficiently innovative.
Even the SFC itself has duly recognised that the qualitative requirements of
the suitability assessment could only be examined subjectively and thus
may lead to uncertainty and unfair decisions.171 Further, the 2018 New
Listing Rules adopt event-based sunset clauses under which the WVR share-
holder may lose the WVR power if certain events occur. One of such events
is that the WVR shareholder is deemed by the HKEX to be incapacitated for
the purpose of performing his or her duties as a director.172 While this pro-
vides a flexible means for the HKEX to terminate the WVR structure when
its benefits have become outweighed by its costs over time, there is uncer-
tainty on what constitutes incapacitation, and thus its efficacy will depend
on how the HKEX exercises its discretion.173
The above issue can become particularly acute due to the inherent conflict
of interest arising from the dual role of the HKEX. On the one hand, the HKEX
has become a listed company on its own exchange since June of 2000.174 Like
any listed company, the HKEX is accountable to its shareholders in terms of
171Securities and Futures Commission, ‘SFC Statement on the SEHK’s Draft Proposal on Weighted Voting
Rights’ SFC News & Announcements (25 June 2015), at https://www.sfc.hk/edistributionWeb/gateway/
EN/news-and-announcements/news/doc?refNo=15PR69.
172HKEX Listing Rule 8A.17(3).
173Some scholars have suggested that dual-class structures should sunset after a fixed period of time (such
as ten or fifteen years) unless their extension is approved by shareholders unaffiliated with the control-
ler. See LA Bebchuk and K Kastiel, ‘The Untenable Case for Perpetual Dual-Class Stock’ (2017) 103 Vir-
ginia Law Review 585–630. The HKEX considered this idea of time-defined ‘sunset’ clause but
eventually rejected it for several reasons. First, it may ‘trigger a change in control at a listed issuer
that would occur at an arbitrary date in the future when the change may not be in the best interests
of the company or its shareholders’ and would cause excessive uncertainty to the WVR shareholder and
the company when the sunset date approaches. Second, it is ‘likely to make the Hong Kong regime
uncompetitive versus overseas markets’, particularly the US and the UK, where no requirement for a
sunset clause exists. Finally, the listing rules just set out minimum standards and the WVR company
can adopt additional sunset clauses. Hong Kong Exchanges and Clearings Ltd (n 30) 41–42.
174The demutualisation of the HKEX materialised after a reform to merge the organised securities
exchanges in Hong Kong initiated by the then Financial Secretary in his budget speech in 1999. See
BM Ho, ‘Demutualization of Organized Securities Exchanges in Hong Kong: The Great Leap Forward’
(2002) 33 Law and Policy in International Business 283–367, at 286–87.
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profit-maximisation, and thus needs to attract more listings to generate
revenue. On the other hand, it is vested with a statutory duty under the
SFO as the front-line regulator of the securities and futures markets.175 It dis-
charges this duty via two broad tasks being: ‘(a) the establishment and promul-
gation of [the Listing Rules] prescribing listing requirements for listing applicants
and listed issuers; and (b) the fair and impartial administration of the Listing
Rules’.176 Hence, in order to maintain market confidence, the HKEX needs to
be very careful in enforcing the WVR regime.
The WVR regime is different from the traditional OSOV regime in many
ways, and it is still a very novel thing in Hong Kong. To help investors make
informed investment decisions, the HKEX and the SFC need to undertake a
more active role in properly promoting the WVR regime through offering
and funding investor education programmes. At a fundamental level, Hong
Kong adopts a disclosure-based securities regulatory philosophy, under
which companies can legally issue their shares for investors to choose, as
long as adequate information disclosure is made. The success of the WVR
regime will in large part depend on the extent to which investors properly
understand the information on the nature and operation of the WVR compa-
nies and take them into account in making their investment decisions.
6. Conclusion
This article aims to evaluate the WVR regime in Hong Kong that was recently
implemented in late April of 2018. Historically, WVR companies existed in
Hong Kong in the 1980s, but due to various reasons, was effectively
banned in 1989. After almost 30 years, the global economic and financial land-
scape have changed significantly, and the debate on the WVR resurfaced in
Hong Kong, with the most notable catalyst being the HKEX losing the
record-breaking Alibaba IPO to the NYSE in 2014.
From a theoretical perspective, the WVR structure has costs in terms of
expropriation risks and entrenchment risks, as well as benefits of enabling
the company to focus on long-term performance and enhancing the compe-
titiveness of the market. It is important, however, to have a contextual analysis
of the costs and benefits of the WVR structure in a particular jurisdiction, and
the real question essentially boils down to the balancing act of whether and
how we can find ways to reap the benefits whilst mitigating the costs in the
local context. Indeed, the re-introduction of the WVR structure in Hong Kong is
accompanied by relevant supporting mechanisms, including entry require-
ments, disclosure requirements and safeguard requirements.
175Section 21(1), Securities and Futures Ordinance (Cap. 571)
176Hong Kong Exchanges and Clearings Ltd, ‘Overview’ (2018), HKEX How We Regulate, at https://www.
hkex.com.hk/Listing/How-We-Regulate/Overview?sc_lang=en.
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This paper analyses the WVR-supporting mechanisms in Hong Kong to
identify the legal strategies used to control agency costs and compares
them with those in Singapore, the US and Canada. It is found that the
Hong Kong regime is most stringent ex ante among the jurisdictions com-
pared and has effective ex post enforcement routes. There are some lingering
concerns, however, including some technical weaknesses, uncertainties over
access of investors to WVR shares and challenges for the regulators. In sum,
the re-introduction of the WVR regime is generally a positive development
for Hong Kong, but it remains to be seen whether the WVR regime will
achieve the purpose for which it was introduced.
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